Office of U.S. Senator Deb Fischer
WASHINGTON – At a hearing yesterday, U.S. Senator Deb Fischer (R-Neb.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the top Republican on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, pressed defense experts on nuclear modernization and workforce challenges.
Senator Fischer questioned Commission on the National Defense Strategy (NDS) Chair Jane M. Harman and Vice Chair Eric S. Edelman on the Commission’s 2024 report, which evaluated the Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy. The report found that the federal government has not integrated national security priorities across departments, fully informed the American people about the threats we face or made sufficient progress in reforming acquisition and research practices.
During the hearing, Senator Fischer referenced her provision in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would require the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy promoting a skilled manufacturing and vocational trade workforce. The provision was introduced as part of Senator Fischer’s bipartisan Restoring American Deterrence Act, a bill to overhaul America’s nuclear preparedness.
On the Role Nuclear Modernization Plays in the NDS Commission’s Proposal:
Senator Fischer: Mr. Ambassador, nuclear deterrence is the foundation, it is the bedrock on which our national security rests. And I understand that the Commission did not seek to replicate the work that came out of the Strategic Posture Commission, but it does highlight the importance of deterrence, strategic deterrence, in view of China’s development, Russia’s aggression, on and on. As you considered the strategic elements of the national security policy for us, can you explain to this committee the role that nuclear modernization plays in the NDS Commission’s proposed Multiple Theater Force Construct?
NDS Commission Vice Chair Eric S. Edelman: Nuclear deterrence, Senator Fischer, you know, is the fundament on which everything else is built, in terms of our national security. It’s operating every day. It’s not visible to American citizens, but the fact of our nuclear deterrent force, all three legs of the triad being available, is the most powerful deterrent that we have to conflict. It’s not sufficient, but it is the absolute basis.
And we really, I think, agreed with the conclusion our colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission reached, which is that we have to move forward with alacrity on all the elements of modernization of the nuclear triad. That’s the GBSD/Sentinel program. That is the B-21. That is the Ohio Replacement Class. All of those things have to be accomplished, and there are problems.
And one of the reasons we highlighted education is that some of the problems that GBSD are running into has to do with lack of skilled workers to be able to pour the kinds of special reinforced concrete that you need for the new silos for missiles, the new control systems for missiles. We lack welders in the submarine industrial bases, as Senator Wicker knows well.
So, there’s a lot that has to be done across the board in order to move forward with nuclear modernization, but it is absolutely fundamental to our ability to deter aggression against our allies, and of course, against the homeland.
On the Barriers the NDS Commission’s Proposal Faces:
Senator Fischer: Thank you, and Representative, I really appreciated your comments on the workforce and the need we have for that, for national strategy. And to be able to work with Senator King, on a bill that we introduced, that we were able to get some of those important factors into the NDAA so that we can address them and hopefully continue to grow what we need and meet those needs quickly. Ambassador, based on the Commission’s work, what do you think are the biggest barriers that we are going to face as a country to achieving that Multiple Theater Force Construct? And Representative, I’d like to hear your opinion on that as well.
NDS Commission Vice Chair Eric S. Edelman: Well, Senator Fischer, to your question, the force right now is too small, and so we have to grow the force. And that’s in the face of the recruiting challenges that we’ve highlighted in the report that the Army, in particular, but also the Navy and the Air Force have faced.
Senator Fischer: I’m going to interrupt you. Why is it too small? Can you explain in this setting the threats that we are facing when we look at the adversaries that we face, and how that has changed over the last decade?
NDS Commission Vice Chair Eric S. Edelman: It’s too small in part because the department was sizing itself for one conflict. But if you have to be present in three theaters, as we are now, we’ve got conflicts in two theaters now. If we have a third conflict in the third theater, it’s going to require, you know, more, a lot more, forces. People talk, for instance, about the Indo-Pacific being largely a Navy and Air Force fight. That’s correct. But the logistics that support the Navy and the Air Force will largely be manned by the Army. And so, we have to have an Army that is sufficiently large that it can operate in all of these places, potentially simultaneously.
Because honestly, it is very hard to imagine today a conflict in the Indo-Pacific that doesn’t become a global conflict very quickly. Someone asked earlier in the hearing about cooperation between Russia and China. The last time I testified before this committee was two years ago about the so-called three-body problem: Russia, China, being both nuclear peers of the United States. And, you know, one of the criticisms that was leveled at my colleague, Frank Miller, and me was that, you know, well, there’s no evidence that Russia and China are collaborating in the nuclear era.
Well, we just saw them flying strategic bombers together, you know, up near Alaska. So, I don’t know what more evidence you want that they’re beginning to collaborate in that strategic area.
NDS Commission Chair Jane M. Harman: If I could just add a few things. First of all, on the nuclear triad and the Nuclear Posture Review, Senator Kyl is a dear friend of ours. He did great service in the Senate and writing that report, and we talked about whether we should, in some ways, overlap some of his recommendations, but we decided they were so good, they should stand alone. So, it’s not that we don’t care. It’s just that we recognize good work.
And add to that, though, that our nuclear agreements that were so important over recent years, especially the heroic work that President Reagan did, don’t include China. And a number of them have lapsed, and that is a truly dangerous situation, especially when rogue states like North Korea and Iran are part of the nuclear game now. And there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or in Asia also. So, just would point that out. In terms of workforce, why is it small? Well, one thing we have not done, and we mentioned this, is embrace the tech sector adequately. Future wars are not going to be fought the old way with vulnerable big platforms.
They’re going to be fought with more software—less hardware, more software. Not to diminish hardware, but we need both. In fact, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was at the Aspen Security Forum last week—some of us were there, Senator Sullivan was there—and he said DoD is not a hardware department.
Right, it’s not, or if it is, it should not be a hardware department. So not only do we need more people, but we need different skills. And we need people who understand the tech base. And in fact, we have said that the business model of the Pentagon ought to move to embrace the business model of the tech sector, where failure sometimes is important so that you can improve things. And just one comment to a prior question. We, some of us, were in Ukraine looking at how they produce goods, including drones and tanks, and they have been much more innovative than we have. And there are lessons to learn there. Thank you.